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Abstract
This article builds on theoretical foundations from enclave urbanism, authoritarian planning and neoliberal urbanisation
to explore contemporary socio‐spatial transformation(s) happening in Cairo, Egypt. Relying on a nationwide road develop‐
ment project, inner‐city neighbourhoods in Cairo are turning into urban enclaves,whereby populations are being separated
by a multiplicity of transport‐related infrastructure projects. As these rapid planning processes are occurring, our article
aims to explain why these developments are crucial and unique in the context of the post‐Arab Spring cities. We argue that
the new road infrastructure is creating a spatially and socially fragmented city and transforming the urban citizenry into a
controllable and navigable body. We use an inductive approach to investigate the effects of the new road infrastructure
and its hegemonic outcomes on the city. On a conceptual level, we propose that the enclaving of the city is a containment
method that has erupted since themassmobilisations of the Arab Spring. In doing so, we use qualitative analysis to explain
empirical evidence showing how the city is being transformed into nodes of enclaves, where communities are getting sep‐
arated from one another via socio‐spatial fault lines.
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1. Introduction
Since 2011, Cairo has undergone multiple changes. The
global economic situation has affected Cairo, like other
cities, by causing further segregation on social, eco‐
nomic and spatial levels. The new Egypt that emerged
post‐2014 was the result of a forceful and intimidat‐
ing reassertion of military power evident at every level.
It could be noticed through the expansion of military
services to include the selling of day‐to‐day products
and dominating the urban development scene. Themost
common driver for such changes, based on literature
and widespread observations, is a belief among the polit‐
ical elite that Egypt needs to reinvent itself to absorb
the 2011 political and socioeconomic shock and to
re‐emerge as a new state, with a readjusted self‐image
to fit into regional and global contexts (Roll, 2014).
Cairo has long been an exhaustively studied city
of the Middle East‐North African region, yet its rapid
changes continue to force researchers to reinvestigate
and reassess its complexity. This article attempts to
comprehend the logic of a city that has—seemingly—
spiralled out of control (Sims, 2012) and has experienced
continuous change since 2011. Yet, it is proving again to
be indeed excessively controlled.
In 2011 and afterwards, we witnessed the re‐
emergence of citizen engagement and, to a certain
extent, a sort of urban activism, using mainly the (right
to the city) as an umbrella discourse to claim most of
the restricted civil rights, focusing on the immediate
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urban needs as a starting point. Such a development has
meant that many of the middle‐class citizens became
engaged in one way or another in the revolutionary
claims for bread, freedom and social justice of the
2011 Egyptian uprising, and moved beyond them in
reshaping the public‐private spheres (Rennick, 2013).
This has posed a challenge to policymakers and power cir‐
cles; whereby new segments of the population became
engaged and politically mobilised and thus should be
contained. Especially working‐class citizenry was used to
utilising hide‐and‐seek tactics with the previous regime.
Also, there was a fairly large segment of society that
had no stance towards much of the uprising and pre‐
ferred to ‘sit and watch,’ which led to considerable ambi‐
guity in predicting their behaviour. In conclusion, the
contemporary Egyptian middle‐class as a social group
has posed puzzling characteristics to the current ruling
regime. On many occasions, this large and heteroge‐
neous group has remained latent and in other moments
displayed volatility in post‐revolutionary times (Abaza,
2014; Sallam, 2013).
The Cairo 2050 planwas intended to be implemented
in 2008–2010, but the active engagement of citizens and
urbanists since the revolution has led to the project’s
delay (Reeve, 2011). By 2014, the New Administrative
Capital (NAC; see Elmouelhi, 2019) project became
known to the public as the new national project for mov‐
ing the capital to the east—i.e., into the desert (Figure 1).
The NAC is the epitome of the current regime’s mind‐
set. It represents and embodies all the aspirations—
and often the insecurities—of Egypt’s new ruling elite.
Between the NAC and the old neighbourhoods of Cairo,
the urban contrast is too powerful to ignore. Where
there is a city, there is its anti‐city (Lindsey, 2017).
According to some statistics, it is estimated that 60%
of Cairo’s existing built environment is considered infor‐
mal or partially illegal development, i.e., only 40% is con‐
sidered formal or fully licensed development (Tadamun,
2014). This leaves most Cairenes to struggle daily simply
to move around in such a complex built environment.
In the past couple of years, some research has inves‐
tigated the reasons behind and the potential effects of
the construction of the NAC (Elmouelhi, 2019; Kingsley,
2015) as Cairo’s main urban‐planning endeavour—and
the role of the ruling regime as the main stakeholder.
Nonetheless, this article is concerned with the urban
transformation of Heliopolis, one of the upper and
middle‐class neighbourhoods in East Cairo (Figure 2).
The neighbourhood of Heliopolis (Masr El Gedida,
which translated from the Arabic means ‘new Egypt’) is a
neighbourhood built in the 20th century by the Belgian
Baron, Édouard Empain (“How Cairo’s Heliopolis her‐
itage managed to remain uncovered,” 2021). Originally a
middle‐class suburb, it became the seat of the Egyptian
Presidency in the 1970s as well as other important state
bodies (Presidency, n.d.); themilitary academy and other
armed forces facilities are also located there (Agence
France‐Presse, 2020). It is well known for its unique
urban heritage, characterised by French‐style avenues
and Islamic‐style buildings (“How Cairo’s Heliopolis her‐
itage managed to remain uncovered,” 2021). In this arti‐
cle, we refer to old neighbourhoods of Cairo as city quar‐
ters that were developed in the late 19th and 20th cen‐
turies (Abu‐Lughod & AlSayyad, 2020). Heliopolis and
downtown Cairo have been part of the political cen‐
tre since the 1980s. The Ittihadeya (‘federal’) Palace
(Figure 3) had previously been an abandoned hotel—
the Grand Heliopolis Hotel—designed by the Belgian
architect Ernest Jaspar and opened in 1910 (interview
with A. M., who wrote his master’s thesis thoroughly
on Heliopolis). In 1972, it became the headquarters of
the Federation of Arab Republics, a loose political con‐
federation that included, at that time, Egypt, Syria and
Libya. Later, the palace became the Egyptian Presidential
Headquarters after Mubarak became president in the
1980s (Presidency, n.d).
In that regard, the importance of Heliopolis arises
from its heavy share of the political and urban history
of the city (Zaineldine, 2020), including its colonial and
post‐colonial roots. This article describes and analyses
Figure 1. The NAC location. Source: Frearson (2015).
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Figure 2. Central Cairo. Source: Map developed by M. W. ElKhateeb for this article based on Google Earth Pro based map.
the changes that have come about to the neighbourhood
under the current regime. We focus on the processes
of urban transformation especially in the formation of
urban enclaves and their effects on the neighbourhood
and eastern Cairo. This in turn led us to tackle the issues
of socio‐spatial fragmentation of the middle class(es) in
that context. The rapid planning and execution of these
new urban interventions have been a cause for suspi‐
cion and worry to planners and observers. Therefore, we
embarked on this article in an attempt to explain and
Figure 3. The Ittihadeya Palace (Grand Heliopolis Hotel). Source: Presidency (n.d).
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contextualise the regime’s tools in containing urban pop‐
ulations post‐2011 uprising.
2. Notes on Methodology
This research article was first conceptualised in the
Spring of 2020; the writing started in Autumn 2020 and
was completed in the Spring of 2021, in Cairo, Berlin and
Freiburg. The fieldwork took place in Cairo and was very
difficult and intensive, especially in terms of interrupted
data collection (due to Covid‐19 restrictions) as well as
in keeping up with the rapid changes that consistently
occurred in the case study area. That demanded finding
a balance between being flexible but also consistent in
approaching our case study. The choice of the case study
was based on previous research phases and as part of
our larger research interests, whereby we deliberately
chose to look into the urban life of the (upper) middle‐
class neighbourhoods of Cairo. In this article, we refer to
the ‘middle class’ as white‐collar citizens with university‐
level education and professional jobs (Burris, 1986).
As for our positionality, we identify ourselves as
middle‐class researchers (male and female; see Burris,
1986), with Western education(s) and living between
home and abroad (Throne, 2012, pp. 55–77). We look
into issues of urban contestation as both inhabitants and
researchers. Since we experience the city ourselves, we
did not disconnect our observations from the empiri‐
cal data sources on which we relied; instead, we com‐
bined them to produce an auto/ethnographic analysis
(Qutoshi, 2015). As qualitative researchers, we used an
inductive‐grounded theory approach (Pulla, 2014), using
primary and secondary resources to reach an answer to
our hypothesis.
For the primary data, the methods used for data
collection were comprised of an online survey, semi‐
structured interviews and ethnographic observation(s).
The period of data collection was from July to November
2020, with some additions in February 2021. Earlier
exploratory research such as informal interviews and
observation had taken place in January 2020. The survey
was administered between September and November
2020 using online tools (Google Forms) and was placed
publicly on social media (Facebook), which yielded
32 respondents in total. This methodology has been
repeatedly used by researchers with numerous positive
and negative results (Lehdonvirta, Oksanen, Räsänen,
& Blank, 2020). We chose this method due to its
convenience in reaching out to respondents from the
case study area, especially due to Covid‐19 restrictions.
We also used the data gathered as an indicative out‐
come about trends. We did not intend to use it as a
quantitative instrument, but rather as a tool to give us
direction about what the respondents were experienc‐
ing. We acknowledge that access to the internet is a lim‐
itation in the search for survey participants, which was
further compounded by the Covid‐19 shutdown of pub‐
lic life. That is why we used the virtual space as an alter‐
native medium for gathering primary data. We followed
and observed citizen interactions on social media pages
discussing the changes happening to the different neigh‐
bourhoods of Cairo. This is considered an experimen‐
tal method in social sciences, but has been particularly
important for our case study since ‘virtual urban contes‐
tation’ has become one of the few alternatives for citi‐
zens’ engagement in urban and political affairs in Cairo,
especially after the 2014 closure of public life (Abaza,
2012; AlSayyad & Guvenc, 2015).
For the semi‐structured interviews, we conducted
seven key informant interviews, with a purposive sam‐
pling approach (Suri, 2011) to talk to some of the
most knowledgeable persons for our chosen case study.
In that regard, we spoke to three members who
had previous or on‐going institutional relationships
(founders) with the Heliopolis Heritage Foundation, as
well as two non‐active members (professional urban
photographers—in addition to their original professions),
and two individuals who had lived in Heliopolis neigh‐
bourhood for a long time (one of them lived there for
40 years, from the 1960s to the 2010s). These interviews
took place in January 2020 (with respondents T. S., K. A.
and M. H.), in August 2020 (with respondent K. B.), in
September 2020 (with respondent A. D.) and in January
2021 (with respondents A. M. and A. Z.) respectively.
For the secondary data, we conducted a literature
review (including newspaper articles) relevant to the
case study, from July 2019 to November 2020.
The data analysis relied on content analysis as we
navigated through literature and complemented it with
our findings from the survey, interviews, field obser‐
vations and ethnographic work, to gain an in‐depth
understanding of the subject at hand (Baur, 2019;
Qutoshi, 2015). A lot of the data was obtained from
internet sources, specifically from social media outlets.
Facebook pages had the largest share of content
due to the predominance of pages that tackled local
urban issues. The virtual nature of social media plat‐
forms allowed us to collect enormous amounts of
data, which were later screened based on necessity,
importance and relevance for the research. A sample
of the observed pages include the Facebook pages
for the “Heliopolis Heritage Initiative,” the “Heliopolis
Chronicles,” the “Heliopolisawy Citizen,” the “We Grew
Up in Heliopolis Public Group,” the “Heliopolis Citizens
Complaints’ Group,” “WhatsUp in Heliopolis and Nasr
City,” among others. Also, there were groups based on
mobile phone applications, for example, a WhatsApp
group for Heliopolis residents’ complaints and a similar
one on Telegram.
The key limitation of this research was the spread
of Covid‐19 globally, especially in the EU, where both
researchers are based, as well as in Egypt where the case
study is situated. That added challenges and limitations
to the research in terms of field data collection and ease
of access to interviewees. In addition, issues of security
arose during fieldwork, whereby our research team had
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to be extra careful during field observation and photogra‐
phy due to the heightened security in the neighbourhood
of Heliopolis.
In terms of research ethics and confidentiality, the
online survey had a statement on the purpose of the
research and was left for voluntary participation (on
the condition of being a resident of the neighbour‐
hood). For the key informant interviews, all partici‐
pants gave verbal consent to mentioning their names
openly in the research; however, we chose to keep them
anonymised and only refer to their initials, for extra vigi‐
lance. For social media sources, all personal information
was anonymised.
3. Research Framework
The research framework relied on readings on author‐
itarian urbanism (Luger, 2016), neoliberal urbanism
(Abaza, 2020; Adham, 2005; Daher, 2013; Harvey, 2005),
urban enclaves and segregation (Caldeira, 1996; Calvet,
2016; Roitman, 2010) and global urbanism (Robinson
& Roy, 2016) to frame the socio‐spatial transformation
occurring in the chosen case study. We also explored
some literature on military urbanism (Abaza, 2020;
Flahive, 2018), urban politics (Saunders, 1986), and
Southern urbanism (Bhan, 2019). Through the literature
review, we formulated the key hypothesis for this arti‐
cle, asking how the process of creating inner‐city urban
enclaves could be considered as an approach to contain
post‐revolutionary cities and to diffuse any potential pub‐
lic mobilisation (Abaza, 2014). This led us to reviewmore
literature on ‘urban diffusion’ as proposed by Adham
(2014), to understand from where the urban visions of
Cairo have emerged in the past decade, as well as to
explore the literature on urban enclaves and road infras‐
tructure as forms of political control. The process of form‐
ing enclaves within the inner city (through the construc‐
tion of roads, fences, bridges, other types of physical
barriers, etc.) and at the outer city (as gated communi‐
ties and high‐end exclusive compounds in suburbia) sug‐
gest that these developments are models of containing
the Cairene population, especially the upper and middle
class(es). Hence, it is evident that there is a deliberate
effort to segregate, fragment and control the city and its
urban population(s).
The discourse of Egypt’s post‐revolution ruling elite
strongly emphasises transforming Cairo into aGlobal City
(Adham, 2005; Robinson & Roy, 2016). Global Cities are
the primary neoliberal centres of economic transactions,
and competitiveness lies at their core, and thus expand‐
ing urban services and logistics is one of their dominant
characteristics. However, the notion of Global Cities has
been criticised for homogenising cultures, commercialis‐
ing the urban, and overlooking the human as a scale for
development (Lefebvre, Elden, & Brenner, 2009). Egypt’s
ruling elite, nonetheless, have adopted a belief after the
revolution (or even shortly before) that the country has
fallen behind in terms of global competitiveness and
should therefore come back and place itself at the fore‐
front of the Arab and African nations as a regional key
player. In policy circles, those beliefs were translated into
the infamous plan of Cairo 2050 (or Cairo 2052, as it
was delayed by two years in 2010, due to the uprising;
see Flahive, 2018), as shown in Figure 4. The 2050 plan
proposed a radical makeover for the city and stressed
the widening of the roads and creating Champs‐Elyseés‐
inspired boulevards as part of a vision that aims to
spatially reorganise the ailing capital to become more
appealing to a global clientele (Reeve, 2011). As Adham
explains, such a vision has erupted from a long process
of exporting a Gulf urban model to Egypt, both culturally
and politically.
This comes, of course, at the expense of the citi‐
zenry, as became evident in several forced evictions in
several cases in downtown Cairo, intending to recap‐
ture land value by instrumentalising the rhetoric of infor‐
mality as well as by dislocating the poor from the cen‐
tral parts of the city (Adham, 2014). Therefore, the
Figure 4. Cairo as a Global City. Source: General Organisation of Physical Planning and Ministry of Housing (2010).
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widening of streets is not a new endeavour for Egyptian
policymakers—it is part of a larger vision of “transform‐
ing the old city into one big flyover heading towards the
new administrative capital” (as stated by A. Z. in an inter‐
view). This comes in parallel to transportation policies
that favour motorised‐private vehicle ownership versus
shared and greener options for transport (El‐Dorghamy,
Allam, Al‐Abyad, & Gasnier, 2015; Reeve, 2011).
4. Producing Urban Enclaves
Enclaves are more than fences. As an urban construct,
enclaves are designed to control yet also give a sense
of privilege to their direct subjects. This separation is
complemented by emphasising the spatial and aesthetic
features of each area concerning other adjacent areas.
Gated communities thrive on social homogeneity, high‐
end amenities, a common aesthetic reference, and a
strong legal code to protect all of these (Atkinson & Ho,
2019). This mode of production of socio‐political space
(Elden, 2007; Löw&Goodwin, 2016) is uniquely designed
to ensure that (upper) middle‐class populations are spa‐
tially disconnected andmade suspicious about the ‘unfa‐
miliar city,’ and so remain controlled in someway. As this
disconnection happens, their positionality within the city
changes and the new spatial order dictates which parts
of the city are to be included in their navigation; only
those deemed as both safe and socially appealing. From
the works of Caldeira (1996), we notice that there is an
emphasis on the notion of (a self‐contained world) in
the formation of the enclaves, which refers to the abil‐
ity of the enclave residents to isolate themselves from
the public life outside the fences of their condominium
(Perry, 2000).
In other words, urban enclaves (and gated commu‐
nities) have a clear distinction between the exclusive
(safe) space and the shared (unsafe) space. Also, they
are mostly occupied by the more affluent segments of
the population. They cater to the exclusivist needs of
the elite (Hashemi, 2019; Nielsen, Sumich, & Bertelsen,
2020; Sumich, 2016). Needless to say, this resonates well
with the economic interests of the ever‐growing real
estate industry. Such a phenomenon is not new to the
world; these enclaves have been shaped and reshaped to
offer new neoliberal urban spaces (Adham, 2005; Daher,
2013; Harvey, 2005) as the grasp of capital tightens. This
is described by Calvet (2016, p. 5) as:
Urban enclaves—private and gated developments
for elitist groups—are a worldwide‐spread mode of
colonisation of the peri‐urban and countryside of
metropolitan areas, in a context of cities under capi‐
talist globalisation and urban neo‐liberalisation.
These notions brought us to sub‐questions that built on
our initial reading to the production of urban enclaves
in the Egyptian context. Firstly, how do we understand
the relation between enclaving, security and aesthetics?
Secondly, how does segregation ensure the overall con‐
tainment of a city?
Against this theoretical backdrop, the next part
presents the analysis from our fieldwork, where we tack‐
led the execution of the new urban interventions in the
neighbourhoods of East Cairo, particularly in Heliopolis.
We investigated the process and the consequences of
the development of new (wider) roads, the construction
of a series of flyovers (bridges) and the sizable reduc‐
tion of sidewalks and green spaces. We also looked into
the new vacant spaces and how inner‐city enclaves have
been produced.
4.1. Material Constructions/Obstructions and Spatial
Grievances
We conceive of the inner‐city neighbourhoods as
enclaves, only after they are transformed as a prod‐
uct of the new road and transport infrastructure inter‐
vention. In this regard, we define them as areas of
the old city neighbourhoods that have long existed yet
became transformed into segments of spaces that have
sharp edges further dissected by roads and traffic cor‐
ridors to separate their boundaries. Their boundaries
appear to be ambiguous, producing a space that is uncon‐
tentious. By uncontentious, wemean a space that has no
clear ownership (No‐Man’s Land). For example, ambigu‐
ous spaces are found underneath a bridge, or along
a concrete wall, or on a highway (Figure 5). Enclaves,
then, are constructed by a deliberate effort to draw
fault lines between suburbs and neighbourhoods, with
clear buffer zones of roads, bridges, vacant spaces and
fences (Hashemi, 2019; Nielsen et al., 2020; Wang &
He, 2019).
As we gathered evidence from our empirical work,
we observed an astonishing decline in the aesthetic qual‐
ity in the Heliopolis neighbourhood. From the interviews,
survey and social media observations, one strong recur‐
rent statement was that the neighbourhood was in a
state of decay despite the new street upgrades. Namely,
the quantity and quality of green spaces had shrunk, the
quality of sidewalks had become very poor, the pedes‐
trian space (and safety) had been sharply reduced, in
addition to the disturbing visual experience of all the
bridges that cut through the neighbourhood; in our
interviews with A. M., T. S., A. D. and K. B they all
pointed out the declining quality of life in the neigh‐
bourhood due to the new street interventions). Based
on that, we concluded that enclaves in the form of
gated communities have displayed better aesthetics and
safety due to the presence of designated security and
seclusion (self‐contained worlds). However, enclaves as
a by‐product of road infrastructure did not display the
same characteristics. On the contrary, they suffered from
a worsened aesthetic value and decreased security due
to the creation of ambiguous spaces (under bridges,
non‐lightened segments of streets, poor sidewalks and
decreased community presence/ownership).
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Figure 5. Tahya Masr (“Long Live Egypt”), a national slogan under a newly constructed bridge. Source: Safa Ashoub.
When we drove through the eastern neighbour‐
hoods of Cairo, we noticed that the widening of roads
and the construction of several flyovers in the neigh‐
bourhood taking place rapidly and without any prior
announcements. Later, the survey respondents and inter‐
views confirmed these observations. The reason was
that in August 2018, several national transport‐related
projects were put in place and implemented rapidly
(Al‐Youm, 2018). Almost all of these projects were intro‐
duced suddenly, without any prior public information or
engagement with the inhabitants. Afterwards, President
El‐Sisi declared that Heliopolis had to undergo impor‐
tant changes to become a transit corridor from and
to the NAC (“Sisi inspects road, bridge constructions in
Heliopolis,” 2019), as shown in Figure 6.
As these projects ran, during the construction works,
the neighbourhood had already begun to experience the
enclaving. For example, in the sub‐district of Almaza,
the residents had had no easy entry to or exit from
their neighbourhood during the construction of a bridge
Figure 6. “Roads, axes and bridges…what is happening in Masr Al Gedida? Al‐Masry Al‐Youm newspaper covering the new
roads, interchanges and bridges’ construction in Heliopolis.” Source: AlMasry AlYoum (2019).
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(Sidhom, 2019a). At that stage, many urbanists, jour‐
nalists, and community activists voiced their concerns.
We followed the social media pages of the neighbour‐
hood andwe recorded the following grievances. Firstwas
the issue of neglecting to inform the public, let alone
opening a channel for participation; second, failing to
plan alternative routes for traffic during the interven‐
tions; third, tree felling and the corresponding loss of
distinctive greenery of Heliopolis (Agence France‐Presse,
2020; Mounir, 2019) as well as elsewhere around the
city as we observed later; fourth, the unconcealed dis‐
regard for community harmony and the destruction of
the historic urban fabric, including irreplaceable villas
and houses (Sidhom, 2019b); fifth, and most critically,
the adverse effects that such interventions have pro‐
duced in terms of road safety and reduced pedestrian‐
ism (Almoghazy, 2020; Shawkat, 2020). All these issues
contributed to the loss of the quality of life in Heliopolis
(nearly all respondents of the survey emphasised how
the newly built roads were blatantly non‐pedestrian‐
friendly and how that negatively impacted the quality of
life of the neighbourhood as a result of such interven‐
tions). Consequently, we concluded that such infrastruc‐
ture development was not meant to improve the lives of
the citizens of the neighbourhood but rather to facilitate
the movement to the new cities in the first place.
4.2. New Roads and the Enclosure of the City
As the current regime is planning to relocate the seat of
government to theNAC (Figure 7), Heliopolis has become
the centre and a symbol of the on‐going policy of violent
transformation.
While there might not be a publicly available doc‐
ument stating these intentions, the actions taken by
the Egyptian government demonstrate that there is an
on‐going policy to readjust public transport projects that
were originally destined to serve the residents of Cairo,
especially the residents of, and commuters heading to,
Heliopolis. Two stark examples of such a policy are the
decimation of Heliopolis’ trams and the cancellation of
the Masaken Sheraton/Cairo Airport metro link.
4.2.1. ‘De‐tramming’ Heliopolis
Trams were introduced to Cairo in the late 19th cen‐
tury as the city expanded beyond its walkable lim‐
its (Chalcraft, 2004; Gouda, 2015). They revolutionised
travel all across Cairo and brought life and economic
benefits to all the neighbourhoods that were within the
trams’ service area or nearby (Chalcraft, 2004).
Heliopolis, however, stood to benefit the most from
the tram network (M. Farid & Abdelhady, 2018; Gouda,
Figure 7. The eastern outskirts of the Greater Cairo metropolitan area with new desert cities. Map developed by
M. W. ElKhateeb for this article based on Google Earth Pro based map.
Urban Planning, 2021, Volume 6, Issue 2, Pages 202–217 209
2015), since it used to be—when the first trams were
inaugurated—themost remote part of town. Trams even‐
tually became synonymous with Heliopolis and became
an icon of local heritage and part of the neighbourhood
(Gouda, 2015). Indeed, almost every other area in Cairo
had the tramlines and trolleybuses removed by the Cairo
Governorate starting in the 1980s (Bahgat et al., 1999), in
favour of expanding roadways and giving priority to pri‐
vate cars (Mitric, 1994) and sometimes in favour of the
underground metro (Bahgat et al., 1999). This era also
witnessed the construction of major inner‐urban high‐
ways such as the 6th of October Bridge and other road
expansions (Mitric, 1994). Nevertheless, the Heliopolis
trams were spared in the first wave of tram removals
in Cairo, and despite the service’s reduced reach and
deteriorating service, trams remained a popularmode of
transport and a cultural icon of Heliopolis (Gouda, 2015;
Huzayyin & Salem, 2013).
Themost recent attempts to dismantle the remaining
trams in Heliopolis surfaced during Galal El‐Said’s reign
as the Governor of Cairo inmid‐2014 (Cairo Governorate,
2020). However,when the CairoGovernorate announced
that they intended to remove some of the tram tracks
and to expand roadways in Heliopolis, the backlash was
immediate and strong (Gouda, 2015; Salamah, 2014).
Unlike the rest of Cairo, the residents of Heliopolis organ‐
ised and formed local neighbourhood committees to try
to prevent the trams from being dismantled (Heliopolis
Heritage Initiative, 2017; Keshk, 2012). This was con‐
firmed in an interview with A. M., who mentioned that
saving the tram was one of the cornerstones of the
Heliopolis Heritage Initiative’s work as a grassroots entity.
One of the few prominent local associations in the neigh‐
bourhood, the Heliopolis Heritage Initiative team, organ‐
ised tours and other cultural activities to keep the trams
alive and to raise awareness regarding the attempts to
dismantle the remaining trams in Heliopolis (Ezzat, 2020;
Gouda, 2015; Keshk, 2012).
By then, the Ministry of Transport had managed to
secure funding from European Institutions to invest in
and upgrade the existing tram network in Heliopolis
(Barrow, 2016; Heliopolis Heritage Initiative, 2017).
However, a few months later, the Governor of Cairo,
El‐Said, ordered the removal of an important intersec‐
tion of tram tracks at Mahkama Square (Atef, 2015;
ElTarawy, 2015; Felfel, 2016; Hamid, 2015) and the
lone tramline connecting Heliopolis to Central Cairo
(ElSharkawy, 2016; Gamal, 2016), effectively kneecap‐
ping the remaining tram network in Heliopolis and
rendering it unusable (Hamid, 2015). El‐Said was later
selected to become the Minister of Transport, where‐
upon he almost immediately shelved the tram upgrade
and renewal projects based on their ‘high cost’ (Ramzy,
2015), even though funding had been secured already
and that Memorandum of Understanding had already
been signed with European funding institutions (Barrow,
2016). Despite the new grim situation and the screech‐
ing halt of the tram upgrade project, some hope had
remained that a future governor or minister of transport
might restore the project and save the remaining trams
of Heliopolis. However, all hopes were dashed when the
remaining tram tracks were removed by the national
and local governments (Figure 8) in a joint project to
expand almost all of themajor Heliopolis boulevards into
urban highways (Almawkef AlMasry, 2020; M. Farid &
Abdelhady, 2018).
Figure 8. The complete removal of trams. Source: EJOLT
(2019).
When the residents of Heliopolis forcefully objected to
the new project and the tram removal, the government
scrambled to organise a community‐stakeholder discus‐
sion after the fact and tried to convince the residents
of the project and its benefit (M. Farid & Abdelhady,
2018). In addition, the Ministry of Environment engaged
in the Et‐Hadar Lel‐Akhdar project (“Get Civilised/Ready
for the Greenery”; see ElMiraghy, 2020), calling on peo‐
ple to plant trees and save the environment, ironically at
the same time that the government was actively remov‐
ing all of the green boulevards and trees from the heart
of Heliopolis (F. Farid & Harabech, 2020), as shown in
Figure 9.
4.2.2. The Heliopolis Metro Station Demoted
The cancellation of the Cairo Airport Metro link, and
how it was (gradually) cancelled, signalled the dwin‐
dling importance of Heliopolis, with the capital being
physically relocated outside the reach of the masses.
Previously, Heliopolis Square metro station was meant
to serve as a ‘central’ metro station in East Cairo.
Based on this plan, the National Authority for Tunnels
built extra facilities and invested in extensive infrastruc‐
ture to accommodate the expected passenger volumes
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descending on the Heliopolis Square metro station
(Ragheb, 2020). However, in 2019, shortly after Kamel
El‐Wazir became the transport minister, the government
announced that the Heliopolis‐Cairo Airport metro link
plan would be revisited and that it would possibly revert
to the original plan, drafted by the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (2002), diverting the airport metro
link to go along the (southern) Adly Mansour branch and
cancelling construction of the North Heliopolis/Masaken
Sheraton route (Habashi, 2019). Then, a fewmonths later
and with minimal press coverage, El‐Wazir announced
that the extension of Line 3 to the airport would not take
place and instead a Bus Rapid Transit route—including
a ‘shuttle bus’ tunnel (Hussein, 2020) connecting to the
airport—would be ‘built’ instead (Hassanen, 2020).
The cancellation of the Cairo Airport/Masaken
Sheraton metro link has adversely impacted the res‐
idents of the northeast of Heliopolis and Masaken
Sheraton, who no longer have any tram service (since
the last remaining routes were removed) and the only
remaining reliable, frequent and popular mode of pub‐
lic transport has been cancelled. That, in effect, has
walled off the residents of Heliopolis and Masaken
Sheraton into isolated enclaves surrounded by impass‐
able urban highways, allowing only the better‐off resi‐
dents who own private vehicles to safely navigate out
of their neighbourhood—a provocative situation, espe‐
cially since only 11% of households in Greater Cairo own
a private vehicle (El‐Dorghamy et al., 2015).
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Transport has embarked
on two new monorail projects: (1) the east route, start‐
ing from Cairo Stadium metro station in Nasr City, pass‐
ing through New Cairo, and terminating at the NAC,
and (2) the other route starting at Giza/Cairo University
(on Line 3) and continuing west to 6th of October City
(Figure 10). Transport officials (“Egypt to import coaches
for Cairo Monorail project,” 2020) were blunt about the
monorail plans serving as a transit route connecting 6th
of October City with the NAC via Line 3, meaning that the
metro will now not only serve the residents of Cairo but
also carry the mass of commuters travelling from 6th of
October City to the NAC, adding burden to the already
crowded metro system.
One just needs to look closely at a map of the newly
built bridges and enormously widened (and rerouted)
roads to notice that the former leafy boulevards that
were a landmark of Heliopolis have been transformed
into inner urban highways cutting through Heliopolis
to allow increased vehicular traffic driving through the
neighbourhood. Heliopolis’ streets have been trans‐
formed into a massive highway interchange, connecting
the Rod El‐Farag Axis (a partly elevated highway con‐
necting to 6th of October City, towards the west), Suez
road (which directly leads to the NAC), and Ismailia road
(which leads to the new cities and suburbs adjacent to
the NAC, in the east).
Yet, paving the way to the New Capital is not the
only explanation for such urban aggression. We also
Figure 9. Al Hegaz Square before and after upgrading.
Source: Hanna (2021).
Figure 10. Monorail construction in New Cairo district.
Note: Date: January 2021. Source: Safa Ashoub.
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observed deeper discussions over social media regard‐
ing an assumption that these unfavourable changes to
the neighbourhood are meant to push residents away
into potential new housing developments in the desert
cities around the New Capital, as numerous Facebook
posts of citizens pages stated. Even though we are care‐
ful about generating conclusions based on these state‐
ments, it seems that there is some truth to this one.
Based on other interviews with the Heliopolis Heritage
Initiative members, they all affirmed such juxtaposition.
As such, we perceived the process of enclaving as dual
in nature: one enclaving that occurs within the inner
city and another in the gated communities of the desert
cities. Both contribute to the overall reorganisation of the
urban middle classes away from the centre and towards
the periphery—and if they must remain, they should be
strictly controlled within solid infrastructural barriers.
When one considers all the different examples dis‐
cussed in this section, a link emerges between the politi‐
cal desire to create seamless urban highways that mainly
aim to keep the flow of vehicular traffic unhindered, and
the desire to quash any form of density or movement
of the masses within the city. By decimating current
public transport and limiting the prospects of such net‐
works within neighbourhoods such as Heliopolis, and at
the same time encouraging more individualised modes
of transport (that only a well‐off minority of Egyptians
can afford), it becomes clear that these new highways
become a ‘wall of roads’ that restrain and enclave the
dense neighbourhoods of the city, making it even harder
for pedestrians and public transit users to navigate the
city; in turn, exacerbating the social fragmentation of
the masses.
5. Shifting Urban Centres; Disempowering Populations
When we talk about Cairo, we know that social and spa‐
tial segregation are nothing new to the city (Adham,
2005; Caldeira, 1996), but perhaps they are currently
assuming new forms. This is especially true when we
observe the impacts of moving power to the periph‐
ery, as the NAC becomes the centre of official political
activity in Cairo (Elmouelhi, 2019). This cannot happen
without the purposeful action of fragmenting the socio‐
spatial cohesion and creating rifts along the social, eco‐
nomic, and physical lines. The constraining of political
freedoms and civil society becomes rooted in an urban
order that reinforces a state of dissociation among its cit‐
izens, this observationwas reiterated several times in the
interviews (with K. B., A. M., M. H. and T. S.). In addi‐
tion to the creation of a state of ambiguity, where no
one knows or sees what is happening outside of policy
circles. Eventually, this leads to the decline of the pub‐
lic sphere available for civil society’s activities (Hasso,
2015; Zayani, 2012). It also leads to undermining the
presence of an effective opposition, as collective action
becomes grounds for suspicion, and the potential for con‐
flict among different social segments is exacerbated due
to the dissociative nature of the newly forged urban fab‐
ric (Hashemi, 2019).
This process of enclaving, we believe, is a newmodel
for containing the city of Cairo and its (upper) middle‐
class residents, whereby the outcome is a city that is
systematically dissected to create dissociation amongst
the urban populations. Why the (upper) middle classes?
Because they simply cannot be predicted or trusted, they
can also mobilise resources, and they are well‐educated
with several accessibility privileges (Burris, 1986). During
the 2011 uprising, a lot of the protests and sit‐ins were
staged by middle‐class activists, even though they did
not suffer political oppression like other groups (leftists
or the Muslim Brotherhood, for example), nor did they
struggle with their daily living (such as working‐class cit‐
izens living in informal settlements or the old deterio‐
rated core) (Sallam, 2013). However, another segment of
the same class(es) stayed at home andwatched the revo‐
lution from their living rooms. That brings us to the belief
that targeting upper and middle classes is a post‐Arab‐
Spring tactic for control and containment. Each segment
is dealt with using appropriate measures—a multiplicity
of carrot‐and‐stick tricks to contain this wide and hetero‐
geneous body of citizenry.
After the failure of the previous generations of New
Cities (such as Sadat City, 10th of Ramadan) to achieve
their target population goals (and to diffuse the urban
agglomeration as well), it seems that the plan now
is to disperse the rich among newly built, exclusive,
gated communities within the new desert cities (Bufano,
2017; Sims, 2018). This urban diffusion (Adham, 2014)
is designed to make such changes permanent, reduc‐
ing the chances that the newly formed urban trends
could be slowed down or reversed in the future, ulti‐
mately making the interconnectedness and permeabil‐
ity of city neighbourhoods significantly less attainable.
In that sense, we are faced with two bulky urban forms,
one that is enclavedwithin the boundaries of the old city,
and another that is fenced across the desert cities within
predetermined parameters. The seizure of the old city
is completed via the development of wider and faster
roads, flyovers, banners, billboards and concrete walls
around certain potentially contentious spaces, some‐
times even arbitrarily. All types of physical barriers are
employed to reduce interconnectedness, permeability,
and mobility. Segregation is complete when there is no
longer a strong sense of community as what we gathered
from the Heliopolis case.
In short, there are three particular intertwined
aspects of the enclaving process that we would like to
explicitly mention here: (1) the process of enclaving as
a political tool for control, (2) the explicit targeting of
(upper) middle‐class citizens—either through diffusion
into new desert cities or through by walling them off and
surrounding them with barricaded spaces—and finally
(3) the issue of expanding streets to appear as a form of
infrastructure upgrading when in reality it is a measure
to ensure the state’s domination over territory.
Urban Planning, 2021, Volume 6, Issue 2, Pages 202–217 212
6. Conclusion
This article is an attempt to conceptualise urban enclav‐
ing as a process that is systematically woven to produce a
new spatial reality. In our view, enclaving is not only the
creation of gated communities and the like; it is rather
a process of controlling the current built environment
through the establishment of roads, highways, bridges
and other types of physical infrastructure that obstruct
access and mobility, or otherwise limit and control the
free movement or assembly of citizens. These inner‐city
enclaves also perpetuate the belief that living in a secu‐
ritised environment is better and safer, especially as pri‐
vate real estate developers promote distant gated com‐
munities out in the desert for the wealthy.
This spatial and socio‐economic contextual analysis is
the result of investigating the nature and the processes
that have produced the current city, with the orches‐
tration of urban and the political agendas of the post
Arab Spring, ruling regime. In answering our hypothe‐
sis, we have concluded that the new road infrastruc‐
ture is part of a larger scheme that seeks to dissolve
the old city using socio‐spatial segregation tools, with
the ultimate objective of controlling and developing the
inner and outer city zones as politically uncontentious
spaces. This happens as rapid planning processes that jus‐
tify its actions with the need to upgrade and achieve an
improved urban environment.
Since Cairo was the capital of the Arab Spring and
has been the locus for collective mobilisations, we stip‐
ulate that the magnitude of the city and its intrica‐
cies have posed a major challenge to urban planners
and politicians. One bi‐product of the revolution was a
counter‐revolution that instrumentalised the discourse
of development to deploy state‐monopolised violence in
the urban space. As a result, this unprecedented urban
aggression means that populations will have to succumb
to a new socio‐spatial‐political order—an order that sees
itself beyond questioning or legitimisation.
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